THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: A PAPER
UMBRELLA IN THE RAIN? INITIAL PITFALLS AND BRIGHTER
PROSPECTS
By Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
The tragedy which befell Rwanda in 1994 deserves a special place in the bloodstained pages of history.
The Rwandan genocide merits distinction primarily because of its shocking efficiency, its scale and its
proportional dimensions among the victim population.1 The Security Council's resolution establishing the
ICTR articulates a set of decisions, assumptions, wishes, and objectives.2 Primarily, the States that voted
in favour of the creation of the ICTR indicated that the root of the problem was individual violations of
international criminal law. Only one State that voted for the resolution did not equate ipso facto ICTR
actions with justice. That State considered the ICTR only one of the many tasks at hand for the
international community. The ICTR was merely a vehicle of justice, ‘but it is hardly designed as a vehicle
for reconciliation.... Reconciliation is a much more complicated process’ (Czech Republic).3 Interestingly,
Rwanda, which voted against the resolution, spoke of the problem in terms of a culture of impunity.4 The
UN paid little to no heed to the subtle, but extremely different way in which the problem was
characterised and the implications this would have on the type of tool needed to deal with that problem. 5

Introduction
The genocide of 1994 was anything but a surprise for the international community. It
was the culmination of many years of cynical indifference and wilful blindness to the
plight of the Rwandan people. In the words of the then Rwandan representative to the
Security Council: “Since 1959 Rwanda has repeatedly experienced collective
massacres, which, as early as 1964, were described by Pope Paul VI and two Nobel
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Prize winners - Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre - as the most atrocious acts of
genocide this century after that of the Jews during the Second World War. But
whenever such tragedies occurred the world kept silent and acted as though it did not
understand that there was a grave problem of the violation of human rights.”6 Thus in
1994, the international community became a spectator to an archetypal genocide, the
attempted extermination of an entire people.

The slaughter required extensive administrative and logistical planning, evidenced by
the chillingly calculated and thorough way in which it was carried out, and by the fact
that most of the victims – between 500,000 and 1 million mainly Tutsi persons as well
as politically moderate Hutu leaders and their families7 - were killed over the relatively
short period from 6 April through the first three weeks of May 1994. This death toll
amounts to roughly ten percent of the Rwandan national population.8 Notwithstanding
the ‘low-tech’ nature of the massacres, (Victims were butchered with machetes (panga),
sticks, tools, and large clubs studded with nails (masu))9 “[t]he dead of Rwanda
accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish dead during the Holocaust. It was
the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
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Nagasaki”.10 The genocide was the culmination of several prior mass killing orgies. It
was a well-organised and coordinated event.11

Immediately

preceding

and

during

the

Rwandan

genocide,

the

political

instrumentalisation of ethnicity was so focused and so pointed that Hutu were led to
believe - and many actually believed - that they were doing good by killing Tutsi. The
genocide was not about ethnic identity operating as a constitutive element of Rwandans’
personal identity. Rather, the genocide was about ethnicity operating coercively as the
unwavering, singular expression of good or evil, of ‘us’ and ‘them’.12

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) grew out of the response of the
UN human rights system to the Rwandan tragedy. Parallel to the efforts within the UN
human rights system, the government of Rwanda that came to power by toppling the
genocidal regime13 made a request to the UN Security Council for assistance to bring
those responsible for the genocide to justice.14 Based on its concern that the serious and
extensive human rights violations in Rwanda would disrupt international peace and
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security,15 the Security Council invoked its Chapter VII authority under the UN Charter
and established the ICTR “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for
genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of Rwanda, and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such
violations committed in the territory of [neighbouring] States, between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994.”16 The preamble of the Resolution states the main objectives of
the International Tribunal to be those of accountability, deterrence and a desire to
contribute to national reconciliation and the maintenance of peace. It is against these
objectives that the performance of the ICTR should be gauged.17 As indicated by the
preambular paragraphs of Security Council Resolution 955 of 1994, the ICTR hopes to
deter the culture of impunity by confronting it with accountability and thus defusing the
cyclical waves of mass killings that plague Rwanda.

15

Serious human rights violations implicate Chapter VII jurisdiction. See L. R. Beres, ‘Iraqi Crimes
During and After the Gulf War: The Imperative Response of International Law’ 15 Loyola of Los Angeles
International and Comparative Law Journal (1993) p. 325; B. M Tocker, ‘Intervention in the Yugoslav
Civil War: The United Nations' Right to Create an International Criminal Tribunal’, 12 Dickinson Journal
of International Law (1994) p. 527.
16
See SC Res 955, supra note 2. See also L. D. Johnson, ‘The International Tribunal for Rwanda’, 67
Revue Internationale de Droit Penal (1996) p. 211; L. S Sunga, ‘The Commission of Experts on Rwanda
and the Creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, 16 Human Rights Law Journal
(1995) p. 121.
17
The Preamble of SC Res 955, supra note 2, provided in part:
The Security Council,
... Expressing once again its grave concern at the reports indicating that genocide
and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international
humanitarian law have been committed in Rwanda, ...
Determined to put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to
justice the persons responsible for them,
Convinced that in the particular circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of
persons responsible for genocide and the above-mentioned violations of
international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would
contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and
maintenance of peace,
Believing that the establishment of an international tribunal for the prosecution of
persons responsible for the above-mentioned violations of international
humanitarian law will contribute to ensuring that such violations are halted and
effectively redressed. . . .

4

The ICTR was intended to bring justice to the most serious perpetrators of the genocide
and other violations of international humanitarian law and to ensure that such violations
do not reoccur.18 However, while courts are needed to enforce law, courts, however, do
not and cannot make human rights real. The achievement of human rights is a much
more complex process than the establishment of a court. While the Rwanda tribunal
responded to the lawyer’s gradualist approach to institutional and normative
development of international criminal law, it initially failed to successfully address the
basic purposes for which it was established, to end impunity and deter potential
offenders. It has been hampered by conceptual considerations.

To delve more deeply into the ICTR’s handicap in addressing the human right’s
situation in Rwanda through the international penal process, this Article makes use of a
distinction of looking at human, social or for that matter world affairs: the actororientated and structure-orientated perspectives.19 They can be seen as two ways of
reflecting, and reflecting on, social affairs and legal tradition, each of them focusing on
different aspects. The legal paradigm (especially criminal law) is biased in favour of the
actor-oriented perspective due to its simplistic concreteness, identification of the evil
actor, apprehension and prosecution. This Article sets out to consider the initial focus of
the ICTR on classical criminal law theory and the failings of this in fulfilling the
broader objectives of the international penal process which transcend the prosecution
and conviction of guilty persons. The Article then moves on to consider the significance
of restorative justice paradigms in reconstructing the post-genocidal society before
concluding with positive trends and transformations that the international and domestic
18
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processes adopted after a realisation of the limited scope of criminal trials in addressing
the genocide.

The Rwandan Genocide: An Event or a State of Affairs
The first prosecutor of the ICTR held views that are generally similar to those of many
within the prosecutorial profession. He believed the fear of detection, financial
penalties, and indignities of guilt were at the centre of criminal justice. Like most
prosecutors, he placed the judicial response at the top of the hierarchy noting, “… all
criminal lawyers will agree, detection and punishment are the only means by which to
curb criminal conduct.”20 Being that the ICTR prosecution office was largely focused
with what to do with the evil actors, the answer was necessarily threefold; converting
them to better intentions, weakening them by depriving them of capability and/or
making them more passive in general. The rude reality though is that the trials and
convictions of the then 53 indictees21 on the ICTR’s list of shame would not have some
kind of legal domino effect on the acts and intents on the rest of the perpetrators
numbering tens of thousands, many of whom were (and still are) active in guerrilla-style
military incursions against the Tutsi-dominated government in power.

Obviously the mass murders in Rwanda did not arise spontaneously. They were
instigated by persons in positions of power who sought to gain personal advantages
through violent and hideous means. Unless these persons are held accountable for their
crimes against humanity, the reconciliation necessary for the reconstruction of this torn
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society may not be possible. By assigning guilt to the leader-instigators, the tribunal
may also lift the burden of collective guilt that settles on the Hutus, whose leaders
directed or ordered such terrible violence. The assignment of guilt by a neutral tribunal
may also enable the international community to differentiate between victims and
aggressors. However the international justice process could not erase the fact that the
interethnic conflict while not genetically inbred, is firmly embedded in the sociocultural structure and subconscious of the Rwandan society and thus addressing this
structural defects is part of the process of deterrence.

The initial sole focus on the ICTR indictees was unrealistic and demonstrated that the
Tribunal was unclear about why it existed and how it could make its modest
contribution for the betterment of human rights in the region.22 There is an abundance of
the ‘evil’ ones, those who have already through their acts proved that they are evil, as
well as those who may be suspected of harbouring evil intentions. The causes of the
Rwandan tragedy rest with them, expressed in their acts or threats or general inclination
to engage in evil acts but the fact is that the international penal process will only try a
minuscule fraction of the whole group of perpetrators, the indictees.23 So many people
were killed principally because there were so many killers. Significant numbers of
Rwandans perpetrated the bloodbath. What induced so many individuals to participate
was not coercion, but rather genuine support of the idea that the Tutsi had to be
eliminated, together with the pursuit of solidarity with others in attaining this goal. This
belief that one was doing right by killing explains why so many of the killings were so
22
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brutal.24 Many Hutus believed that killing the Tutsi was a civic duty - in other words,
nothing less than the right thing to do.25 An even larger number of people acquiesced in
the face of genocide. The killings were committed publicly and were known to all.26
They ‘did not take place at out-of-the-way sites…[but] throughout the country: in
virtually every village and in almost every urban neighbourhood’.27 The indirect or
direct participation of so many people in the Rwandan genocide blurs the line between
guilt and innocence.

In order to perform the genocide, the Hutu leaders over the years succeeded in
organising a campaign that redefined the Tutsis (the victim group) as worthless, outside
the web of mutual obligations, a threat to the Hutu hegemony, and in the run-up to the
1994 genocidal conflagration, as subhuman. Even after such a campaign of vilification
and dehumanisation28 the actual performance of the mass killing required a good deal of
coercion and centralised control that converted a large segment of the Hutu populace
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into a band of mass killers and thus criminals. While much was initially said about the
pragmatic dimension of punishing mass human rights violations through prosecutions as
a preventive measure no paradigm was set out in relation to the task of post-conflict
peace-building which entails a psychological dimension of justice and reconciliation.

The ICTR’s initial almost exclusive focus on concrete entities; the individual as a
building block of the genocidal reality was distorting and obscuring the structural reality
that converted tens of thousands of Hutus into a mass of killers, turning on their friends,
neighbours and colleagues.29 The 1994 genocide followed three earlier rounds of
massacres targeting Tutsis in 1959, 1963 and 1966.30 The 1994 bloodbath was preceded
by a macabre dress rehearsal in 1992.31 With preparations complete, in 1994 the
government was able to manipulate the structure founded on sharp, ethno-centric rift by
fuelling the hatred through national radio (Radio Television Libre des Mille Collines)
broadcasts that dehumanised the Tutsis as ‘inyenzi’ (cockroaches),32 facilitating the
creation of an effective killing machine that stretched from the city suburbs to remote
farms in the village.
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This process of dehumanisation was a contrivance of populist leaders which feed on the
primitive impulse to denigrate the Tutsis as a means of self-affirmation. Before ordinary
Hutu could participate in the slaughter of defenceless men, women and children, the
Tutsi had to be portrayed as an inherently bloodthirsty and cruel people out to break the
Hutu hegemony through violence and thus, it was necessary to launch preventive
measures, which incidentally took the form of preventive violence. The Hutus were
spurred on by exhortations appealing to them as a collectivity to preserve their ethnic
hegemony by eliminating all sympathisers and supporters of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) whose military successes had forced the government onto the negotiation
table.33

For many though, the ICTR would establish individual guilt and thereby move
suspicion and blame from the group to the individual. It was a laudable goal, but a
complex one in the circumstance. For crimes to be crimes there must be an individual
act. These crimes may or may not be part of a criminal enterprise. When a crime is part
of a criminal enterprise, the nature of the relation between the individual, crime, and
society profoundly changes.34 Any penal response to a criminal enterprise must
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understand the entire crime and its relation to society to begin to address it effectively
through the justice system.35

Within the ICTR’s early framework of thinking, the genocidal acts by extremist Hutus
were seen as an event, not a state of affairs; something that was is and probably will
continue to lurk in the sub-consciousness of the extremists. It may be a slowly or
quickly changing state of affairs, depending on the circumstances, key among which is
the process of the extremists reclaiming back political and military authority in Rwanda.
The war in Rwanda is unfinished; there was not even a temporary respite after the
genocide, before the Hutu-Tutsi struggle for the control of the State resumed. There is
little doubt in this context that the ICTR was largely seen by Hutus, as international
punishment by the victors, Tutsis with the blessing and support of the United Nations.36
Tutsis may themselves see the Tribunal and the genocide trials they are conducting in
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Rwanda as their opportunity for revenge.37 The ICTR being initially obsessed by a need
to be neutral and independent distanced itself from the overall political settlement of the
Hutu-Tutsi struggle for political power and thus was virtually irrelevant to the future of
Rwanda.38

What the ICTR (and the international community) hoped to achieve in the euphoric
early days of the ICTR soon fell victim to the reality of the structural underpinning of
the genocide. The ICTR hoped to bring about a discontinuous jump, by breaking the
vicious cycle of human rights violations through an international presence that was little
felt in Rwanda itself. It was not apparent then that the deep-seated animosity between
the two segments of the Rwandan population would not dispel easily by a few years of
international justice. The animosity and hatred was cultivated, reinforced and
manipulated for over six decades by the colonial powers, then well nurtured by the Hutu
leaders who ascended to power after independence. It has taken close to a century to
achieve a well-entrenched social structure pegged on ethnic stratification, founded on
deep-seated hatred.39 This is not to say that the effort at prosecution is an exercise in
futility. Obviously there are actors around otherwise the structure would not operate.
Individual guilt, leading to prosecution is important, but it should not detract from the
flaws in the Rwandan social structure. The actor-oriented perspective draws its strength
from its simplistic concreteness; its ability at capturing concrete actors; the individuals.
But only a segment of an actor is in the structure, and only a part of the structure shows
37
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up in any one particular actor. While the ICTR’s indictees may have been architects of
the genocide, they simply tapped into the huge reservoir of ethno-centric hate that had
been entrenched in the sub-consciousness of Hutu’s converting a great deal of them into
pathological killers.

Having a positive impact on a complex socio-political process is not the same as
successfully prosecuting a person for a criminal violation of human rights law in accord
with the law. Only by seeking to address the causal factors of the genocide would the
ICTR translate its prosecutorial victories into victory for human rights in Rwanda. The
ICTR initially failed to provide an institutional framework that would contribute to the
extremely complex process of moving a society from one characterised by massive
human rights violations to one built upon the respect of human rights law. A key
oversight in the ICTR’s prosecutorial strategy was its failure to seek to address the
accumulation of collectively organised evil within the Rwandan society, entrenched
over a period of almost one century.40

A Leaky Sieve? The Pitfalls of Classical Criminal Law Theory
Virtually all theories of criminal justice can be characterized as either retributive or
deterrent (utilitarian).41 For utilitarians punishment is justified to the extent it produces a
socially

desirable

consequence,

ordinarily

39

general

deterrence.42
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consequences are irrelevant for retributionists. Rather they consider it simply morally
fitting that criminal offenders are punished.43 Described by R. Solomon, “the desire for
retribution is the desire for vengeance (,)…getting even, putting the world back in
balance”.44 The international penal process at the ICTR was initially firmly focused on
deterrent and retributive aspects of the criminal process with little pragmatic effort to
incorporate rehabilitative and restorative aspects into its overall strategy.

The Deterrence Theory
Whether the offence is tax evasion or genocide, deterrence theory presupposes a
rational, utility-maximizing actor. Persons commit crimes, so the theory goes, when the
expected value of doing so exceeds the cost of punishment. To reduce crime, society
need only raise the price by imposing harsh penalties. The complexity of the Rwandan
situation and the operations of the ICTR would frustrate those who advocate
punishment as deterrence. Societies engulfed by mass political violence are not
particularly conducive to rational behaviour or fears of eventual apprehension. How can
we expect individuals to make a rational choice calculus when they are surrounded by
hysteria, social chaos, panic, coercion, prejudice, and a government that is exhorting
mass violence?45 Layered on top of the irrational context in which mass violence
43
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operates is the reality that an individual’s decision to act violently may not be perceived
as a legal or even a moral wrong. When taken together, these two factors support the
conclusion that choices to participate in mass violence well may be only slightly, if at
all, deterred by the prospect of eventual prosecution - especially if undertaken by some
distant international tribunal. If those committing the barbarities do not expect to lose
power to the victims (or to third parties such as international authorities), they may not
take the threat of penal sanction very seriously.46

Punishments even if they are imposed to any real extent by the ICTR, will be meted out
slowly, given limited resources.47 The fact that cases are handled in a slow and
circuitous manner contravenes the axiom that for deterrence to work punishments must
be meted out with swiftness and certainty.48 It is unrealistic to presuppose that a nascent
institution operating in the Rwandan genocidal context could act efficiently enough for
the desired deterrent impact to be realised. Approximately 125,000 individuals - roughly
ten percent of the adult male Hutu population - are incarcerated in Rwandan jails
designed to hold 15,000.49 At the present rate of national trials, it would take hundreds
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of years to adjudge all of these detainees.50 The ICTR was not of much help either in
reducing the number of detainees, by late 2000, after spending over 200 million dollars;
it had indicted 53 individuals and heard only nine cases.51

Seemingly, the ICTR’s presence was not having the intended sobering effect on the
Hutu extremists. This would be largely because the general stance of the international
community was to view the genocide in terms of a sudden event, the evil act of the evil
actor, and thus the international penal process is seen as a remedy. But the evil act rests
within a large part of the population, something permanent, the permanent evil intent
among extremists in both groups wrought by a volatile social structure pegged on deepseated animosity that has spawned a strong culture of hatred and ethnic rift.

While the creation of the ICTR may have a lasting effect on the application of
humanitarian law to both international and domestic conflicts and accomplish what its
first Prosecutor Goldstone stated, as the significant task of and human rights squarely on
the international agenda,52 the Tribunal ran the risk of not making a significant
contribution if it failed to generate substantial appreciation on the part of Hutus of the
extreme criminality of acts of the mass killings, or with regard to the Tutsis, the fact that
reciprocal counter-measures whether low intensity or not, amount to crimes based on
the same legal standards that the Hutus face.
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It is not enough that the international penal process classifies the behaviour as wrong,
extremely distasteful and the acts as international crimes. Until the Hutus (and
extremists among the Tutsis who may have a vision of grand vengeance) are capable of
doing so, they will not abstain from the act, risk of bad conscience or the risk of the
State or international community applying normal standards built into national law and
international treaties. Thus the extremists see their post-genocidal intention and actions
in another direction, killing yes, but not with the intent of wiping out the other group,
but with the intention of avenging their own personal losses, and furthering themselves
and their ethnic hegemony through erosion and attrition of the other group in numbers.
As Professor M. Drumbl notes:

“Many [domestic] detainees see themselves as prisoners of war, simply ending up
on the losing side. In fact, the prisoners do not even call the events of April to July
1994 the ‘genocide,’ but, instead, refer to these events as ‘the war.”53

The Retributive Theory
Retributionists believe that if offenders are not punished for their crimes, then other
people will not respect the criminal law and not obey it. For this school of thought, the
focus is on the development of strategies for administering the courts, the police and the
prisons more effectively.54 Retribution attracts people that want a quick fix crime
solution. Its usefulness as a tool for building a strong culture of justice in post-genocide
Rwanda society was therefore limited. Retribution merely shifts the revenge over from
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the individual to the State (and Tribunal).55 The ICTR was imbued with like sentiment
and the characteristic self-righteous tenor of those striving to secure the ‘deserved’
punishment of others. This is not surprising, a look at Security Council proceedings
regarding the aims of the ICTR unearths a majoritarian view by participating States
favouring the ‘just desserts’ discourse.56 There is perhaps no greater canard than the
idea that punitive justice provides needed therapy for individuals; that nothing can
assuage anger or restore dignity like punishment. The emphasis on victimhood, blame,
and powerlessness may actually undermine recovery from violent crime.

The willingness to punish the unusual is a basic criminal law philosophy. But if an actor
commits an act that can be seen as ‘normal’ in the precise sense that the other actors in
the same position would commit the same acts in the same situation, the justice process
is then seen as motivated by vengeance. Mass violence constitutes what C. S. Santiago
Nino, citing Kant, calls ‘radical evil’.57 ‘Radical evil’ amounts to violence in situations
where acting violently is simply not deviant. Nino observes that “the kind of collective
behaviour that leads to radical evil would not have materialized unless carried out with a
high degree of conviction on the part of those who participated in it”.58 When this
conviction is broadly shared, it loses its deviance no matter how pronounced its
ugliness. Thus the extremists may see the international penal process as the
consequence of their loss of political and military authority in Rwanda and not so much,
as a process aimed specifically at their push to homogenise Rwanda and the resulting
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atrocities. On the hand, the Tutsis are more focused on the national trials that will send
the guilty to the gallows, not some ritzy international trial that will send the guilty to
Europe.

Although the ICTR has a multi-million dollar budget, by late 2000, The ICTR had 53
indictees, 45 of who were in custody59 and the Rwandan prisons have some 125,000
individuals in custody over the genocide. The ICTR had completed only 4 trials, while
the work on the 48 other cases was still underway. The fact though is that between
75,000 to 150,000 possible defendants spread throughout Rwanda and in neighbouring
countries as refugees will never see the inside of a courtroom.60 What about them? Do
they get the message that their actions were wrong and atrocious? For some yes, for
most unlikely. Journalist P. Gourevitch asks and then eerily concludes: “[W]hat
if…murder and rape become the rule?”61 “During the genocide, the work of the killers
was not regarded as a crime in Rwanda; it was effectively the law of the land….”62 The
ICTR relied on the actor-oriented approach in which it is easy to see who should be
apprehended, arraigned into court, adjudicated and eventually punished.63 This objective
tended not to build dynamism and dialectics into the ICTR’s vision on not only
prosecuting the guilty, but also addressing impunity. The ICTR sought to depict and
regulate an event where certain acts are proscribed. The rest was left open.
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Restorative Justice: Beyond a Simplistic Bipolar Leitmotiv
Analysing the negative implications of criminal trials in the reconstruction of postgenocide Rwandan society, Professor M. Drumbl astutely notes that:

“Trials create a bipolar leitmotiv of the postgenocidal society, which is binarily
deconstructed into the ‘guilty’ and the ‘innocent’. This deconstruction runs the risk
of oversimplifying history by negating the importance of collective wrongdoing,
acquiescent complicity, and the embeddedness of ‘radical evil’. By treating
genocidal violence as an individualised, pathological, and deviant transgression of
social propriety, the criminal justice system may do the dualist postgenocidal society
a disservice by blanketing and perpetuating the structural nature of this violence to
the detriment of survivors and future generations. Blaming occurrences of radical
evil entirely on the existence of some evil people obscures the fact that so many
people, to varying degrees of complicity, are required for ‘radical evil’ to operate
publicly on a macro level.”64

The more holistic perspective of restorative justice may actually help a society manage
multiple goals because it identifies restoration - not deterrence, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, or retribution - as the overarching goal of criminal justice. A restorative
approach seems needed in all societies that have suffered massive and collective
victimisation.65 There had to be an effort to identify that there are other units,
individuals or groups that should be the target of efforts to restore order to the badly
fractured Rwandan society. Backing a remedy designed to socialise individuals, the
ICTR simply envisioned a society disintegrated into an amoral Hobbesian war of all
against all, rather than into rival moral communities. Deftly noted by Dennis Wrong, for
group-level conflict to occur, the individual group members must already ”have been
socialised to…correctly gauge the expectations of others, internalise at least some
norms, and possess selves sensitive to the appraisal of others”.66 The familiar lack of
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remorse shown for acts that if committed against a member of one’s own group would
draw heavy censure, signals a disjunction between groups’ values and norms.

The ICTR’s seeming view that applying individual level justice would promote social
order was bound to fail if it was the only tool envisaged. Individual level punishments
can only affect a permanent change if the cause of the deviant behaviour resides solely
with the individual.67 In Rwanda, however, it is impossible to conclude that the causes
of deviance reside with the individual. As the ICTR was focusing its attention on
individual deviants, it was presenting the world, and the Rwandans, with the image of a
person who needs correcting through punishment instead of a social system, structurally
stratified by ethnic rift that needs reorganisation. The Tribunal while an important
instrument by which those responsible for the genocide are distinguished from moderate
Hutus, needed to be nonetheless be alive to the destabilising effect being posed by Hutu
extremists, many of who are not in custody, and are unlikely to ever face prosecution.

While the prosecution of former leaders is an essential ingredient for reconciliation at
the political level, there has to be a corresponding transformation of values among the
Rwandan people who have been subjected to decades of incitement to ethnic hatred and
violence, whether as victim or as obedient perpetrator. The Tutsi must absolve the Hutu
of indefinite collective responsibility for the genocide while also having a legitimate
means of vindicating their suffering through a ‘collective catharsis’. The ICTR in
concert with the Rwanda national trials can play a decisive role in this respect.
Structures cannot be juridical persons with intentions and capabilities. They cannot
156; M. Thompson-Noel, ‘Home Truths About Genocide-Murderous Disputes in Faraway Places Bring
Out the Honest Pessimist’ Financial Times (London), 13 January 1996, xvi.
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distinguish between right and wrong. While structures cannot be put on trial, they can
be changed through rehabilitation, by focusing on them as the primary root of the
problem as well as the indictees of the tribunal.

Attention needed be paid to how reconciliation could be facilitated in post-genocide
Rwanda. Adopting a restorative approach seemed part of the answer. The restorative
school of criminal justice demonstrates the importance of behavioural, material,
emotional, and cognitive outcomes for victims, offenders, and societal members.68
Success in sanctioning is measured by the degree of reparation for the victims and their
participation, or better yet their ownership, in the process. It also includes the
recognition of the offenders of wrongdoing and their level of empathy with victims. It is
further measured by the development of a shared perspective in society that offenders
have been denounced and held accountable in a fair process. The Rwandan courts
largely lacked credibility (and still do) with the group of perpetrators being prosecuted
by an overwhelmingly Tutsi government, being overwhelmingly Hutu. Ethnic
stratification is replayed as basically, the Tutsis are prosecuting the Hutus, the victors
are entombing their victory through judicial process. The Rwandan national trials stood
to gain by closer, formal cooperation between the national and international process, to
alleviate the credibility problem.

While the Rwandan courts received mixed, and to a degree improving, reviews, many of
the first trials were considered a disaster from a due process perspective. Most of the
more than 125,000 detainees were arbitrarily arrested and have been detained for long
67
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periods without trial.69 To many in Rwanda, this process negatively colours their
impression of the Rwandan government and its ability to fairly treat those accused of
genocide. The Rwandan trials will not help achieve reconciliation if they are considered
unfair or if they are removed from the population.70 Rwanda itself warned when
advocating for the creation of a tribunal with international participation of ‘victor’s
justice’ if it organised the trials on its own.71

It would seem the case in Rwanda, that lasting reconciliation requires assigning
individual responsibility for the atrocities, while it is imperative that trials of those
accused take place, clearly, the most resonant of such trials will be those in Rwanda,
organised and accomplished by the Rwandan people, so that individual responsibility is
an internal, rather than an external designation.72 It follows that the high profile of the
ICTR, was overshadowing and stealing the ‘thunder’ from the national trials rather than
complementing them. The ICTR had just about all the ‘big fish’ while the rest were left
to the Rwandan national courts.

The major reason why the international and national justice systems were failing to
respond adequately to the Rwandan situation is that they inadequately focused on the
crimes by defining them only as law breaking. The concentration is then solely on the
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resulting adversarial relationship between government (or Tribunal) and the criminal
offender. This existing pattern of thinking fails to address, or even recognise, the other
dimensions involved. A human rights crime is not merely an offence against the State.
Likewise, justice is more than punishment and incapacitation. There are larger issues at
play, notably the issue of standards and norms. Despite the public nature of the
genocidal violence, there is very little generally accepted truth in Rwanda as to what
exactly happened from April to July 1994.73 In this regard, a truth commission could
help establish an historical narrative of what happened as well as why it happened;

74

after this record is established, Rwandan society then could be better positioned to
render a moral evaluation of the genocide.75

In a deeply divided society, arguably the only type of society likely to produce the types
of crimes for which the ICTR was established, criminal prosecutions do not necessarily
have a conciliatory effect. Rather, they manifest and exacerbate division if seen as some
sort of panacea. This follows in part because those who would occupy the dock are
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inevitably and widely seen as symbolic representatives of their group.76 The association
is even greater in cases involving ‘big fish’. As the prosecution declared at the opening
of the Adolf Eichmann trial, “It is not an individual that is in the dock (,)…but antiSemitism throughout history”.77 Given its metaphorical significance, one can hardly
expect the ICTR to ameliorate collective guilt. On the contrary, it may actually revive
and inflame antagonistic sentiment.78

The overall purpose of restorative justice is the reintegration of victims and offenders
who have resolved their conflicts into safe communities.79 This purpose can only be
achieved when multiple parties (victims, offenders, communities, governments) pursue
multiple goals (redress, fairness, healing, and rehabilitation). There have been killings
of a number of unarmed civilians, some by members of the Rwandan security forces,
others by armed opposition groups (the interahamwe militia), others by unidentified
assailants. Members of local defence forces have been responsible for killings and other
abuses, especially in the northwest of Rwanda, sometimes in conjunction with Rwanda
Patriotic Army (RPA) soldiers.80 This reinforced the need to pursue multiple goals
within the framework of objectives of the international justice system otherwise, the
international community would have to find an alternative way to address human rights
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abuses by an overzealous Tutsi-dominated army, clearly having personal and official
business weaved into a single tapestry.

A presupposition of the ICTR was that formal mechanisms are integral to uphold group
life and to stem deviant behaviour.81 Reminiscent of pre-sociological thought, this view
overlooked the “complex network of social ties which spontaneously creates a
normative order that exists independently of (legal institutions)”.82 Cooperation and
understanding by the Rwandan society is a sine qua non of long term ethnocentric hate
control and societal restructuring. Although the Tutsis are now in control they cannot
hold it without the goodwill of the Hutu segment.83 For lasting peace, N. Mandela
proclaimed, “we do not rely on laws, we rely purely on persuasion”.84 Where society
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depends instead on law, Gandhi concluded that “law ceases to be law, and society
ceases to be society”.85

The inter-ethnic hatred in Rwanda is a ‘deep-culture’, a socio-cultural code embedded
in the collective subconscious of the group entities, defining for that collective that it is
normal/natural to adopt a ‘no-holds-barred’ approach to gaining ethnical supremacy and
preserving the resulting ethnic hegemony. Being subconscious, there is not much
individual awareness of deeply rooted international legal standards steering the rest of
the world, the result of almost a century of brainwashing. With a deep structure of
hatred and animosity rooted in a culture, the ICTR was running against something very
solid indeed. A signal challenge to the ICTR is the core precept of Satyagraha, that the
ends pre-exist in the means. In Gandhi’s words, “the belief that there is no connection
between the means and the end is a great mistake…. The means may be likened to a
seed, the end to a tree; and there is just the same inviolable connection between the
means and the end as there is between the seed and the tree.”86

Waking up to Reality: Trends and Transformations
Developments on the ICTR Front
Killings in Rwanda rose in the period after the ICTR’s founding.87 Although currently
the number of killings inside Rwanda has decreased compared to the rather bloody
1998-2000 period, killings of unarmed civilians and ‘disappearances’ were still reported
85
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throughout 2001-2002. As government troops regained control of the northwest, the
armed conflict abated and the level of violence decreased. However, the situation
remained tense and the peace fragile. In many respects, the armed conflict during which
thousands of civilians had been killed in Rwanda in 1998 continued over the border in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The presence of armed groups continued to
be reported sporadically in Rwanda near the DRC border and the Rwandan Patriotic
Army (RPA) (formerly the rebel RPF) carried out military operations in this area.88

The ICTR’s existence and presence in Eastern Africa was seemingly doing little to deter
extremist Hutus in neighbouring countries from waging bloody guerrilla-style
excursions into Rwanda. Thousands of unarmed civilians were killed across the border,
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), in an armed conflict involving several
governments, including Rwanda, as well as various armed opposition groups, including
Rwandan interahamwe militia and soldiers of the former Rwandan armed forces. The
Rwandan government offered support to the rebel Congolese Rally for democracy
(RCD) part of the deal being permission to conduct military operations in Congolese
territory against Hutu extremists. The overzealous Rwandan government troops were
not averse to conducting ruthless military operations around refugee camps89 reinforcing
its apparent commitment to consolidating a national ethnocracy. The same zeal was
reflected by the Hutu extremists keen to wrestle back the reins of power from the Tutsi
dominated government.
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2000

(2000),

The ICTR was criticized (and rightly so) for not achieving its mandate swiftly enough.
Although the ICTR has a multi-million dollar budget, by early 2000, six years after its
establishment it had completed only four trials, while the work on the 48 other cases
was still underway. One of the reasons for the delays, however, is that the ICTR is a
nascent criminal court. At the start of 2000 however the ICTR shook of the lethargy that
characterized its earlier years of existence. The ICTR made significant progress on
numerous fronts in 2000. In addition to securing new convictions and concluding
several appeals, the Tribunal significantly improved its relationship with the Rwandan
government. The Tribunal began the year under a cloud of severely strained relations
with the Rwandan government in the aftermath of the Appeals Chamber’s 1999 decision
to dismiss charges against J. Barayagwiza.90 However, in March 2000, the Appeals
Chamber quashed the earlier ruling and reinstated charges against Barayagwiza, which
the Rwandan government saluted as a “victory for victims.”91

Keenly aware that an international justice process that fails to deter individuals with
reason enough to value their lives and freedom can only be regarded as meaningless, the
ICTR took numerous steps to repair and improve its relationships with the Rwandan
government and citizens. In 2000, ICTR judges for the first time agreed to requests by
the Rwandan government to personally visit crime scenes.92 More significantly, the
ICTR’s chief prosecutor, C. Ponte, announced that she would ask the Trial Chambers to
hold future hearings in Rwanda, and that in the future “it might even be possible to ...
90
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[move] the entire Tribunal to Kigali.”93 Furthermore, in September 2000 the ICTR
opened an information and outreach centre in Kigali, which will house a public
information area, documents repository and legal library, and manage the Victims
Assistance Programme.94

Fifteen months later, relations between the ICTR and the Rwandan government took a
turn for the worse. The first sign of trouble occurred in January 2002 when two key
Rwandan genocide survivors’ groups not only suspended their cooperation with the
ICTR but also called on the Rwandan Government to do the same.95 Three months later
in March 2002, a proposal for a joint ICTR/government task force fell on its face due to
the “inability to agree on certain fundamental points, beyond compromise, regarding the
proposed commission’s terms of reference.”96

It would appear that this was a politically motivated action based on the Prosecutor’s
investigation of crimes allegedly committed by the Rwanda Patriotic Army soldiers
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affiliated with the current government.97 The Prosecutor later brought the dispute before
the UN Security Council, noting that the attitude of the Government toward the tribunal
had “hardened” because the ICTR began investigations of individuals with connections
to the current Rwandan army.98 The Rwandan government soon backed away from its
contentious policies but not after a sweetener was thrown its way, a freeze on
investigations of RPF, yet another blow to the overall bid for reconciliation. Later in
2002, the frosty relations thawed when Chief Prosecutor, C. Ponte, announced her
intention to transfer forty suspects to Rwanda and other national jurisdictions for
prosecutions bringing to fruition a promise made almost two years earlier.99 In addition,
the Security Council granted the ICTR’s request to create a pool of eighteen ad litem
judges to supplement the work of the nine trial judges already sitting on the ICTR with
an aim of increased speed and efficiency after enacting similar reforms for the ICTY.100

The improved relations between the ICTR and the Rwandan government may facilitate
what many believe is necessary to the ICTR’s legitimacy - investigation and, if
appropriate, indictment and prosecution of persons from the largely Tutsi Rwandan
97
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Patriotic Front (RPF).101 The RPF is the rebel movement that seized power after the
massacres in Rwanda, and remains in power as Rwanda’s current government. The
failure of the ICTR to indict RPF members exposed the Tribunal to criticisms of being a
“victor’s tribunal.”102 The ICTR chief prosecutor not only intends to investigate RPF
members, but initially publicly secured the cooperation of the Rwandan government in
this endeavour.103

On the trial front, between 1 July 2001 and 30 June 2002, 11 accused persons were
arrested, and the Prosecutions Division submitted 14 new indictments for confirmation,
all of which were confirmed. Of the 60 persons already arrested, 8 were sentenced, 1
was acquitted, 22 are involved in ongoing trials and 29 are in custody awaiting the
commencement of their trials”.104 In the same period, the Tribunal was actively engaged
in trials. Nine trials of 22 accused persons were in progress before three Trial Chambers,
with three judgments in respect of four accused being rendered the following year.105 By
the close of 2002, 81 individuals had been indicted by the ICTR, with 61 in custody and
twenty at large.106 Eight people had been convicted by the ICTR, and the Appeals
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Chamber upheld seven of those convictions.107 The 2001 acquittal of one individual was
also upheld on appeal, and one appeal is currently pending.108 Trials are ongoing for
twenty-two individuals.109 By the end of January 2004, the ICTR had rendered 15
judgments involving 21 accused. This brings the total number of judgments during the
ICTR’s second mandate to nine involving 14 accused. This represents a two-fold
increase in trials compared to its first mandate (1995-1999). The Prosecutor also revised
the ICTR’s future investigation programme from the originally estimated number of 136
new suspects to 14 new individuals, together with 10 ongoing investigations. The
resulting 24 new indictments, which the Prosecutor intends to submit for confirmation
by the end of 2004, will conclude the investigation programme.110

More importantly, the Prosecutor identified 40 suspects whose prosecution was to be
deferred to national jurisdictions for trial. Fifteen of these suspects were in countries
that have adopted the principle of universal jurisdiction and could be tried in these
countries. The cases of 25 other suspects who did not occupy high positions of
responsibility could be transferred to the Rwandan authorities. This move is important
as there is now a working strategy between the international and national penal
processes. Instead of the initial position of the ICTR dealing solely with individual
criminals and not with a culture of impunity, there is now recognition that synergy
between the international and domestic penal processes will give the latter legitimacy
and facilitate restorative justice initiatives. The structural distance of the ICTR from the
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Rwandan social process is being bridged and increasingly making the work of the
ICTR’s relevant to the Rwandan populace.

Developments on the National Front
After the 1994 genocide, the Rwandan government did not have the judicial capacity or
the legislation to deal with crimes of genocide. In 1996, therefore, the government
adopted the Organic Law on the Organization of Prosecutions for Offences Constituting
the Crimes of Genocide or Crimes Against Humanity Committed since 1 October 1990
(‘Genocide Law’) and created a special judicial chamber to try the genocide cases an
effort to hold individuals who will not be prosecuted by the ICTR responsible for
international humanitarian law violations. The law created 13 specialised chambers
within the court structure to deal with cases flowing from the genocide.111 The Rwandan
judicial system, however, still is not capable of enforcing the Constitution and other
laws, honouring the rights of the accused, or processing cases within a reasonable time
frame.112

Although the status of the special chamber created to hear genocide cases and the
judicial system as a whole has improved since 1994, the judiciary continues to suffer
from inadequate resources, inefficiency, corruption, and executive influence.113 As few
individuals with legal training were left in the country after the 1994 conflict, the
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country has struggled to find replacements for these key positions.114 Many of the
judges are subject to threats of death or bodily injury and occasional influence by the
government.115

The shortage of prosecutors and defence attorneys also has made it difficult to establish
fair trials. Those individuals who do serve these functions are also susceptible to threats.
Accusations have been made that prosecutors or defence counsels who readily support
the rights of the accused will themselves become susceptible to charges of genocide.116
The accused are entitled to a defence attorney under the 1996 genocide law, but the state
will not provide one if the accused is indigent.

Many people who are incarcerated have not yet had charges brought against them. With
the help of foreign assistance, case files were created for over fifty percent of the
detainees in 1998.117 Periodically, the government releases thousands of suspects for
which the prosecution has no case files. Though upwards of 15,000 prisoners have
confessed, few of them have been processed because there are not enough officials to
handle this volume of cases.118 The situation is even worse for those who are awaiting
judgment by the Rwandan judicial system. As of February 2000, 130,000 individuals
were awaiting trial on genocide charges. They were incarcerated in deplorable
conditions: in prisons and military and communal detention centres that have an official
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capacity of 30,000.119 A number of these individuals have been detained since 1994.120
Although Rwandan law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, unlawful detentions and
arrests are common.121 Despite the fact that Rwandan law prohibits torture, NGOs
report that the Rwandan authorities have tortured detainees.122 This only serves to
reinforce the hard feelings between the two groups, as it appears to be some kind of
victors justice, that may even turn the pacific sentiments held by moderate Hutus into
bitterness. Specifically referring to the Rwandan proceedings, M. Minow concludes that
“[r]ather than ending the cycles of revenge, the trials themselves were revenge”.123 No
doubt the Hutu extremists will be itching for a chance to pay back the Tutsis in their
own coin in the future.

In the past seven years since the passage of the domestic Genocide Law, over 5,000
defendants have been processed by the specialized chambers124 however this though
extremely impressive is inadequate. Senior judicial officials of the ICTR have noted that
at the current processing speed it would likely take “400 years to try the 120,000
people” in Rwandan prisons.125 In view of the slow pace of trials and the citizenry’s
continued cries for justice, in July 1997, the government of Rwanda began
contemplating alternatives to dealing with the huge numbers of detainees, the slow pace
of trials and the lack of national reconciliation. It established a National Unity and
119
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Reconciliation Commission in 1999 that initiated countrywide consultations on issues
of co-existence between Hutus and Tutsis.126 The Commission ultimately recommended
that Rwanda adopt the traditional Gacaca system, whereby respected community elders
endeavour to bring disputants together in an effort to render communal justice.127 In
turn, this led to the adoption of Organic Law No. 40/2000 of 26 January 2001, setting
up “Gacaca jurisdictions.”128 The Gacaca courts were inaugurated in 2002. Roughly
260,000 men and women from every community were elected to preside over the
courts, each of which has nineteen judges.129 Rwanda’s President, Paul Kagame, urged
all Rwandans to participate in the Gacaca process, which began widespread
implementation in June 2002.130 The participatory justice system of “gacaca,” a
traditional mechanism for settling village quarrels, to deal with lower level offenders at
a community level is an important move in the restorative justice paradigm. Kent
Roach’s review of public inquiries131 reveals that their unique institutional features
allow them to hold organisations and society accountable in ways that courts cannot.132
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The Gacaca Law preserves the basic structure of offences and the procedures for
confessions and guilty pleas established by the Genocide Law, which formed the basis
for domestic genocide trials.133 Specifically, it classifies detainees into one of four
categories according to their alleged participation in particular crimes. “As in the
Genocide Law, the Gacaca Law provides an incentive for defendants to confess and
plead guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence. For both confession procedures, half of
the defendant’s sentence will be served in custody while the rest is commuted into
community service.”134

The gacaca system could have potentially positive or negative effects on achieving
accountability and reconciliation in Rwanda. On the positive side, gacaca could ease the
burden on the courts and prison system by helping to quickly process the innocent and
guilty. The process also could have a cathartic effect by allowing many individuals in
society to discuss the genocide, participate in the creation of justice and a standard of
responsibility for criminal actions, and more swiftly deal with recent traumatic events.
Gacaca advocates argue that gacaca is a more efficient solution for Rwanda because
rehabilitative penalties can be quickly assigned if “the moral force of the village [is
used] to shame perpetrators into admitting the truth.”135 Some Rwandans, who feel that
Western- style justice is not working, believe this kind of group justice will serve as a
tool for reconciliation.136 For example, Rwandan Justice Minister J. Mucyo, believes
that the gacaca system will lead to truth for the whole society whereas western-style
133
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justice only leads to a small part of the truth for the accused, the judge, and the
victims.137 This view is echoed by P. Ironside who observes:

“In the context of post-genocidal Rwanda, Gacaca may well be able to heal the deep
wounds that continue to divide the country by ethnicity in a manner for which
Western retributive systems are not designed. Indeed, it is unrealistic, impractical
and short-sighted to rely solely on the ordinary criminal law model with all of its
due process guarantees to address mass perpetration of crimes, particularly in a
country whose judicial system has to be built ex nihilo and where ethnic tensions
continue to run high.”138

Observers however have expressed a number of concerns with the gacaca system.139
Numerous concerns arise from the fact that the Gacaca system is structured as a speedy
penal justice process but lacking the requisite due process safeguards. Although the
African Commission on Human & People’s Rights stated in its Dakar Declaration of 11
September 1999 that “traditional courts are not exempt from the provisions of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights relating to a fair trial,”140 the Gacaca
process falls short of this and other internationally recognized standards. For instance,
the Gacaca Law does not mention any entitlement of defendants to legal
representation;141 the Gacaca Law does not allow defendants to present evidence during
the process when the defendants are graded according to the severity of their crimes;142
and the practice of distributing cases for processing to Gacaca jurisdictions based on the
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defendant’s residence before the genocide will inevitably result in unequal
administration of justice.143

There are several other disadvantages to the gacaca system. As P. Ironside cautions “…
many of its features resemble those of the criminal justice system but without all of the
accompanying procedural safeguards, which raises concerns as to whether the new
system will simply amount to criminal justice in the guise of popular justice.”144 In a
further sobering reflection, Ironside observes that “Notwithstanding its capacity to yield
beneficial, indeed essential, results, the Gacaca system also raises a number of valid
concerns. For instance, while the process may heal some wounds, it could actually reopen others and thereby exacerbate ethnic tensions. The potential also exists that the
government’s motives are not altogether virtuous in instituting the Gacaca system, but
rather stem from the increasing rate of acquittals by the specialized chambers, which the
government may wish to curb by subjecting defendants to Gacaca’s community
justice.”145 Overall then, the process could breed the spirit of vengeance and bitterness
and help continue the culture of impunity instead of prevent it. Individuals participating
in these processes might fabricate stories in order to seek revenge against certain
individuals, feel reluctant to hold their families and neighbours accountable, or see this
not as an opportunity to seek justice, but revenge.146 If these shortcomings could be
dealt with, however, gacaca could have a significant impact by helping individuals
realize on a personal level that they live in a society with accountability, law, and
justice. In summary, although the Rwandan justice system still has a long way to go
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before becoming a model of impartiality and justice, international observers have
reported that it has continued to make progress since the 1994 conflict.147

The Rwandan government has taken further steps outside the traditional adversarial
legal system to deal with the genocide in the past and to prevent mass atrocities in the
future. In 1999 the Rwandan government established a National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) and a National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC).148
The role of the NHRC is to investigate human rights violations, especially by state
actors, to train Rwandan citizens about human rights, and to assist in the initiation of
judicial proceedings against persons suspected of committing human rights
violations.149 These initiatives are important since much of the Tutsi minority,
historically dominant, lives with the phobia of its physical elimination, while the Hutu
majority demands proper political representation. The 1994 genocide in Rwanda
heightened the fears of the minority, creating a volatile situation in which extremist
elements in both communities may destroy the fragile peace in existence. In such an
environment, dissemination of the wrongfulness of the ethno-centric hatred is important
in avoiding the voices of moderation being drowned out, silenced or eliminated
altogether. 150
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Conclusion
The UN and the international community were initially lulled into thinking that justice
would come to Rwanda with an ‘effective’ ICTR, which was succeeding in securing
custody of many of its indictees. A few years down the road, it was clear that the
genocide in Rwanda was in fact the product of years of human rights violations151 and
that an intense, creative, and sustained intervention involving the Rwandan government,
civil society actors, UN entities, international financial institutions, and bilateral funding
agencies was therefore needed to address the full spectrum of human rights.

If the ideal is to facilitate positive social change in Rwanda that brings about
reconciliation and the respect for human rights, a system based on ill-thought-out
symbolic justice or attainable mass retribution had to be re-oriented with a more
thought-out and creative strategy regarding the structure and operation of the ICTR and
a synergy with Rwandan domestic penal process. An actor-oriented perspective alone
cannot prevent future human rights violations in Rwanda. It is unable to react
adequately to social evils built into the social structure of the Rwandan society. The
experience of the past nine years shows that the vicious cycle of violence, though
somewhat muted, is very much alive.152 The Gacaca system provides an innovative and
practical blend of retributive and restorative justice since it is within communities that
most of the atrocities took place during the genocide yet victims were initially largely
alienated from the international and domestic by distance, procedure and lack of
151
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communication. “Because Gacaca is based on local culture, it is likely to create from the
beginning a greater sense of familiarity, respect, trust and commitment to the process
than the Western judicial system. As members of the community, Gacaca judges will
have a sense of the full measure of injury that the community has suffered and can lead
hearings to address those facts.”153 However there are valid grounds that despite its
overall philosophy based on traditional dispute resolution, the system has significant
penal characteristics albeit with few or no procedural safeguards against error or
abuse.154 The Rwandan government must maintain active vigilance over the process lest
it becomes a conduit for settling scores-real and imagined.

It is evident that the ugliness of the genocidal conflagration and the political reality of
the ethnic hatred cannot be isolated into an international courtroom for resolution. The
ICTR stands to make more sense if it was part of a comprehensive domestic and
international process of punishment, reconstruction, and reconciliation. The Rwandan
have a greater understanding of what is necessary to ensure that prosecutions meet the
nation’s most important objectives. They are the people in struggle and cooperation, in
association and disassociation. A complementary twin approach by the national and
international penal process through a synchronic formula is likely to hit at the volatile
polarised structure by challenging it through judicial activity. This will contribute to the
Rwandan seeing their divided socio-political structure as one of the primary sources of
their tragedy and try and withdraw or change it. The ICTR has had positive influences
on the Rwandan national trials through allowing ‘raw’ Rwandan judges with little legal
crime. See ‘Rebel Leader Says He Is Not In Arusha to Negotiate’, Internews, 24 July 2000,
http://www.africanews.org/rwanda/ stories, visited 30 March 2001.
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experience to attend ICTR trial sessions a move that is of enormous benefit to the newly
trained jurists. In addition the ICTR has increasingly turned to a policy of generally
enforcing its sentences in African prisons.155 The aim is not only to correct its image in
Rwanda and Africa as a multi-million dollar Western conscience cleaning exercise but
also to shed its image as a ritzy court that guarantees the guilty tickets to ‘luxurious’
European prisons. In addition it seeks to have a greater deterrent effect against impunity
Africa, a continent that has largely come to be associated with despotic rulers, civil
strife and sovereign excesses.

Even as the Rwandan government moves to try individuals handed over from the ICTR,
it ought to bear in mind the need to both chastise the Hutus but also absolve the entire
community indefinitely of guilt. As long as the individuals on the dock are seen in the
wider context of the guilt of a community, the prosecutions can only lead to less
chances of reconciliation and re-integration. More so as the individuals cut across
various spectra of Rwandan society-military commanders and politicians, civilian
administrators, the clergy and journalists thus seemingly representing a guilt that
transcends all levels to cover each and every social rung of the Hutus. The Rwandan
government, especially the judicial branch, should continue to take steps to ensure the
legitimacy of its national genocide trials. The Rwandan society will benefit from fair
and neutral judicial process than quick trials that seem to reflect political expedience as
opposed to law. If the Rwandan justice system does not establish itself as a fair and just
system, it could just as easily contribute to the cycle of vengeance as it could to ending
it. On going conflict in the region and atrocities over which the ICTR has no jurisdiction
154
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should fall within the purview of the domestic justice process which is not straitjacketed
by a Security Council mandate as the ICTR is. Selective enforcement of the law against
Hutu’s will not help dispel the ethnic venom of hatred which needs to be dispelled
through both positive political goodwill as well as legal impartiality.156

The establishment of the ICTR and its singular focus on the prosecution of a miniscule
fraction of the perpetrators of the genocide was initially a woefully inadequate way to
redress the brutal murder of millions of Rwandans. However, the ICTR’s initially sterile
approach has subsequently been supplemented by conflict management and resolution
measures. These developments have been important in laying ground for a new
paradigm combining the actor-oriented and structure-oriented perspectives, promoting
an international law that truly permeates the human populace, not stopping at the gates
of the State but bridging the gap between collective and individual actors better than it
had done before. The key condition for such change is consciousness, and more
sensitivity to the actor-structure relationship. Alongside trials, the outreach centre will
facilitate dissemination of information that will help the two communities understand
the weakness of the social structure and help ensure that the Rwanda situation is not
simply a change of guard, one ethnic hegemony for another.
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